

01-052 – Risk taxonomy for ports: a case study of the Port of Valencia – Taxonomía de riesgos para puertos: caso de estudio del Puerto de Valencia

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Over last years, there has been a clear trend in the port sector towards risk management to ensure the continuity of key activities and achieve resilience. This emphasis is driven by global incidents and the recognition of ports as critical infrastructures. Effective risk management is essential for maintaining the operational integrity and security of these vital nodes in the global supply chains. Defining risks accurately is crucial, as overly generalized risk identification can undermine the effectiveness of risk analysis. This study proposes a comprehensive risk taxonomy for ports, designed to systematically identify and categorize a wide range of potential risks. The methodology involves comparing different literature sources and conducting focus groups with industry experts. This approach ensures a thorough examination of existing knowledge and practical insights. The results include a hierarchical classification of interrelated risk categories, obtaining a detailed risk catalogue. This structured approach enhances the precision of risk identification, enabling ports to better anticipate and mitigate potential threats. A case study of the Port of Valencia is provided to prove the validity of the proposed taxonomy. It demonstrates how taxonomy can be applied in real-world setting, highlighting its practical benefits and effectiveness in improving risk management practices in port operations.

Keywords: *Risk; Taxonomy; Resilience; Business continuity; Ports*

En los últimos años los puertos han centrado su atención en la gestión de riesgos para aumentar su resiliencia, tras su reconocimiento como infraestructuras críticas. La gestión eficaz de riesgos es esencial para mantener la integridad operativa y la seguridad de estos nodos clave en las cadenas de suministro globales. Definir los riesgos con precisión es crucial, ya que una identificación excesivamente generalizada puede mermar la efectividad de su análisis. Este estudio propone una taxonomía de riesgos integral para puertos, diseñada para identificar y categorizar sus riesgos potenciales. La metodología implica la comparación de diferentes fuentes bibliográficas y la realización de comités de expertos. Este enfoque asegura un examen exhaustivo del conocimiento existente y de las percepciones prácticas. Los resultados incluyen una clasificación jerárquica de categorías de riesgos, que conduce a la obtención de un catálogo de riesgos. Este enfoque estructurado mejora la identificación de riesgos, permitiendo a los puertos anticipar y mitigar mejor las amenazas potenciales. Se proporciona un estudio de caso del Puerto de Valencia para mostrar la validez de la taxonomía propuesta, en un entorno real, destacando sus beneficios prácticos y su efectividad en la mejora de la gestión de riesgos en las operaciones portuarias.

Palabras claves: *Riesgo; Taxonomía; Resiliencia; Continuidad de negocio; Puertos*



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1. Introduction

Building effective resilience schemes is essential for minimizing the impacts of disruptions in critical sectors. At the core of resilience development lies the process of risk analysis, which provides the foundation for understanding vulnerabilities and implementing measures to mitigate potential risks. Risk analysis consists of multiple phases, with risk identification being one of the most crucial steps. Accurate identification enables targeted planning and prevention strategies, making detailed taxonomies indispensable for facilitating a precise and comprehensive identification process.

A notable contribution to this domain is the work of Ouedraogo et al. (2020), which presents a taxonomy based on a review of literature prior to 2020. This taxonomy served as a valuable framework for categorizing risks at the time. However, the global landscape has undergone significant transformations in the past five years, marked by high-impact events such as the COVID-19 pandemic, geopolitical conflicts, warfare, natural disasters—including floods in Valencia and earthquakes in Asia—trade disruptions, port congestion, and maritime accidents. These occurrences have reshaped the dynamics of risks in the port and maritime sectors, underscoring the need to revisit and update existing taxonomies.

Major global disruptions in the last five years—such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine war, maritime attacks originating from Yemen, and the imposition of trade tariffs by the Trump administration—have introduced a new set of complex risks. These include geopolitical instability, supply chain volatility, and elevated security threats. Such developments necessitate a significant update to pre-2020 risk frameworks to accurately reflect the modern risk environment faced by ports.

This paper addresses the necessity of revising port and maritime risk taxonomies to reflect the evolving risk landscape influenced by recent global events. By incorporating updated insights, it aims to enhance the accuracy and utility of risk identification frameworks, thereby supporting more effective resilience planning.

2. Objectives

The study aims to develop a comprehensive and hierarchical taxonomy for port risks, building on recent advancements and challenges highlighted in the literature from 2021 to 2025. By conducting an extensive review, the proposed taxonomy seeks to reflect the evolving landscape of port risks, incorporating insights from contemporary global events and sector-specific transformations. This effort is designed to provide a robust framework that addresses the need for updated methodologies in risk categorization.

Additionally, the study endeavors to compare this newly developed taxonomy with the framework proposed by Ouedraogo, identifying key differences in scope, focus, and applicability. The comparison will highlight newly emerging risks and those that have gained or lost prominence over time, reflecting changes in priorities driven by recent developments. By contrasting these frameworks, the study aims to underline the advancements and adjustments necessary to address current and future challenges.

Emerging risk trends also form a critical component of the study's objectives. It will delve into the analysis of recently defined risks and evaluate their significance within the port and maritime sectors. This exploration aims to comment on how these risks have evolved, identifying those that have garnered greater attention and those that have diminished in importance due to shifts in the global and industry-specific context.


The study further presents a practical application through a case study of the Port of Valencia. Using the proposed taxonomy, the study seeks to illustrate how the port can develop a localized framework to identify and categorize specific risks pertinent to its operations. This customized taxonomy will serve as the foundation for risk measurement and resilience planning, demonstrating the utility of the new framework in real-world scenarios.

3. Methodology

This section aims to detail the methodology followed to define a novel port risk taxonomy by means of a systematic literature review and the analysis of an expert focus group. This group was assembled, consisting of two industrial engineers with expertise in port organization management, two academics specialized in project management, and two professionals from port-related organizations. The methodology is divided in five sections and eight phases (Figure 1).

- **Context building.** It involves establishing the foundation of the study, clearly defining the objectives to streamline the bibliographic search and enhance the effectiveness of the subsequent analysis.
- **Data collection.** Its aim is to identify the appropriate data sources and formulate a precise search strategy to collect the information that most effectively aligns with the intended objective.
- **Data selection.** This section aims at gathering the most relevant articles and classifying them in specific categories to optimize the subsequent analysis.
- **Data analysis.** This process involves a detailed examination of pertinent information to identify patterns, uncover insights, and extract meaningful trends.
- **Port risk taxonomy modelling.** The focus group works on establishing the novel taxonomy considering the trends and patterns observed.

Figure 1: Methodology phases.



3.1 Purpose definition (phase 1)

The main purpose of this study is to develop a comprehensive hierarchical taxonomy of port risks, drawing insights from the analysis and review of literature published between 2021 and 2025.

Risk taxonomies seen in literature are usually structured into two levels: risk typology and the risk itself. This can result in a non-uniform definition of risks due to the absence of a higher level of granularity. When applying two-leveled taxonomies to specific scenarios, such as a port case study, this limitation manifests in lists of risks where some are overly generic while others are excessively specific.

To address this issue, it is crucial to expand the taxonomy structure by incorporating more levels. This adjustment allows for a clear distinction between risk categories, risk factors, and the risks themselves, ensuring a more precise and consistent classification.

Risk categories serve as classifications that group together various risk factors, each representing a specific level of division. These risk factors are distinct types of risks that are directly associated with a particular category or subcategory, which, in turn, may encompass numerous examples of risks (Akac & Anagnostopoulou, 2025).

3.2 Base taxonomy selection (phase 2)

Since the purpose is to research port risk taxonomies that have been studied in the past five years, there should be a reference taxonomy to part from relative to the years before. In this study, the taxonomy from Ouedraogo et al. (2020) was selected as it does an extensive literature review on port risk catalogues from before 2020.

Ouedraogo et al. (2020) specifically identify several risk class associated to seven risk typologies: supply risk, demand risk, business risk, operational risk, environmental risk, organizational risk and infrastructural risk. A risk class refers to the regrouping of risks into distinct categories. The outcome of their analysis revealed the risk class shown in *Table 1*.

Supply risks, for example, also known as logistical risks, disrupt the flow of products through bottlenecks, labor strikes, or equipment shortages, highlighting the need for a resilient port system. These foundational risks directly impact the smooth circulation of goods, making them critical considerations in risk management strategies. Complementing these are *demand risks*, which emerge from unpredictable variations in customer requirements, such as unexpected fluctuations in long-term contracts or spot market needs. These uncertainties compel maritime companies to adapt their pricing strategies and operational capacities swiftly.

Financial stability is heavily influenced by *business risks*, which encompass economic challenges like supplier management, fluctuations in stock market returns, and macroeconomic factors. These risks are connected to *operational risks*, or technical risks, which arise during the transportation process. Whether it is congestion, fire, terrorism, piracy, or even mismanagement in handling and stowage, operational risks have been at the forefront of maritime literature due to their direct and immediate impact on port activities (C. A. Ouedraogo et al., 2020).

However, risks in maritime transport are not limited to human or logistical factors. The sector also contends with *environmental risks*, spanning from natural disasters like earthquakes and cyclones to man-made crises such as political conflicts or civil unrest. These hazards are disruptive, often resulting in delays, financial losses, and impediments to cargo flow. While natural elements challenge operations, internal management inefficiencies, contained within *organizational risks*, further aggravate potential situations. Such risks stem from inadequate

planning, poor estimation, or mismanagement, all of which can compromise safety and operational effectiveness.

Lastly, ports are susceptible to *infrastructural risks*, which highlight vulnerabilities within the very structures supporting maritime transport. Failures in infrastructure, delays in information flow, insufficient transportation options, or inadequate port capacity can severely disrupt the maritime supply chain. These risks, coupled with technological considerations, underscore the necessity for robust infrastructure development to sustain efficient operations.

Table 1: Risk class (C. A. Ouedraogo et al., 2020).

Risk class	Risk
SUPPLY RISK	Lack of equipment
	Bottlenecks
	Labor strike
	Bad handling
	Lack of human resource
	Unstable maintenance
	Carelessness
	Lack of motivation among workforce
	Lack of skilled workers
DEMAND RISK	Unexpected customer demand
BUSINESS RISK	Purchase and sale of supplier companies
	Production cost
	Fuel cost
	Storage cost
	Funding
	Tax changes
	Debt ratio changes
	Return on investment changes
OPERATIONAL RISK	Route deviation
	Congestion
	Fire
	Terrorism
	Unexpected door opening
	Unexpected temperature variation
	Unexpected humidity variation
	Container/goods damage
	Container/good theft
	Container lost
	Piracy
	Long waiting time
	Stowage

Risk class	Risk
	Ship collision
	Condition of cargo handling
	Explosion
	Shocks
ENVIRONMENTAL	Uncertainty weather
	Natural disasters
	Political conflicts
	Man made crises
ORGANIZATIONAL	Problems with document interpretation
	Inappropriate estimation of planning
INFRASTRUCTURAL	Lack of visibility
	Delay in transmission
	Lack of transportation mode
	Port capacity
	Lack of relevant information
	Cyber-attack

3.3 Data collection (phase 3)

The study's articles were gathered from four primary bibliographic databases: Google Scholar (91 articles), ScienceDirect (49 articles), Scopus (33 articles), and WoS (52 articles). Additionally, 15 articles were sourced from other relevant platforms, including the websites of key organizations and institutions within the sector, such as ESPO (European Sea Ports Organization), UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), and IAPH (International Association of Ports and Harbors).

The search period was restricted to publications from 2021 to 2025. The search employed keywords such as "port risks," "maritime risks," "risk identification," "risk analysis," "maritime resilience," "port risk taxonomy," and "maritime risk categories." This process resulted in the collection of a total of 240 articles during this stage.

3.4 Duplicate removal (phase 4)

The fourth phase involved identifying duplicate articles and excluding them from the analysis. As a result, 26 articles were eliminated, leaving a total of 214 articles for the subsequent phase.

3.5 Data selection and organization (phase 5)

Selecting the most relevant articles for the analysis constitutes a crucial phase of the methodology, as it sharpens the focus and refines the scope of the study. The process began with an initial screening of titles, abstracts, and conclusions, which led to the exclusion of 11 articles whose objectives were not directly related to or aligned with the final goal of the study. Subsequently, a deeper review and analysis of the remaining articles were conducted, concentrating on the risk identification phase within risk assessment frameworks to extract lists and catalogs of risks.

As a result of this in-depth process, the articles were categorized into 11 main thematic groups:

1. Environmental, climate change, and biosecurity risks (19 articles)
2. Cybersecurity risks (36 articles)
3. Events and disasters (3 articles)
4. Natural hazards (8 articles)
5. Maritime accident risks (46 articles)
6. Operational risks (29 articles)
7. Safety and security risks (21 articles)
8. Risk propagation (5 articles)
9. Risk taxonomy methodologies (18 articles)
10. Resilience frameworks (11 articles)
11. Port risk categorization (48 articles).

It is worth noting that some articles were classified into more than one group, given their relevance across multiple categories.

3.6 Data analysis (phase 6)

Most of the literature reviewed make a first classification of risks into internal and external. Factors within the control of ports and the shipping industry are considered internal. These include the organization of shipping networks and the capacity of ports to handle demands efficiently, which are vital to supporting global supply chains. The expansion and enhancement of container terminals by port authorities and terminal operators often align with evolving global supply chains and associated shipping frameworks (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2022). In recent years, internal risks have notably influenced the safety and efficiency of maritime container supply chains. Issues within organizational processes can severely disrupt logistics and operational performance (Ilyas et al., 2023).

Conversely, external factors arise from outside the maritime supply chain and encompass external forces that typically influence the demand for maritime transport. These, in turn, affect the volume of cargo processed by ports and shipping services. Generally, the shipping industry and ports have limited or no influence over such factors, such as economic trends that impact trade volumes (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2022).

According to Kuang et al. (2021) external influences are more significant than internal ones as they are often unforeseen and beyond control. Natural occurrences play a prominent role among external factors, often causing interruptions and delays. However, internal challenges also contribute to these delays and are shaped by factors such as human involvement, infrastructure, management processes, and information flow.

Risks can also be categorized broadly as either natural or human-induced. Natural risks are abrupt, uncontrollable changes in the environment, whereas human-made risks stem from either deliberate or accidental actions within society that may harm or disrupt organizations and individuals (Nagi & Kersten, 2022).

When comparing recent literature to the base taxonomy established by Ouedraogo et al. (2020), it is evident that all originally defined categories remain consistent across subsequent publications. Classifications such as supply, business, operational, environmental, organizational, and infrastructural factors continue to hold relevance. Furthermore, Ouedraogo et al. (2022) builds upon its earlier analysis by examining these categories in the context of varying actors and decision-making levels throughout the supply chain.

In addition to the foundational categories, new risk classifications have emerged, expanding the base taxonomy to include aspects such as management, technology, social dynamics,

market trends, political influences, and network-related factors. These additional categories have been acknowledged and studied extensively in recent Works (Akac & Anagnostopoulou, 2025; IAPH, 2023; Ilyas et al., 2023; Jia & Zhang, 2021; Kuang et al., 2021; Lamii et al., 2022; Nagi & Kersten, 2022; Ouedraogo et al., 2022; Sajith et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2024; Zhou, 2022).

Emerging trends in risk analysis increasingly focus on failures related to artificial intelligence, which pose threats to cybersecurity and encompass issues such as data inaccuracies, software defects, system integration challenges, algorithmic errors, and human mistakes (Durlík et al., 2024). Another innovative aspect gaining prominence in recent literature is the concept of resilience enablers, which highlight critical inflection points where errors might occur. Examples of resilience enablers include flexibility, market regulation, operational efficiency, agility, schedule reliability, port governance, and collaborative partnerships, among others (Deng et al., 2025; Jiang et al., 2021; Liu et al., 2023; Tian et al., 2025; Wendler-Bosco & Nicholson, 2020).

3.7 Risk category and sub-category definition (phase 7)


After analyzing the selected data, a focus group of maritime sector experts convened to define the first two levels of the proposed port risk taxonomy: risk categories (first order) and subcategories (second order). The group initially sought to distinguish between internal and external factors. While man-made factors could be classified as either internal or external, natural factors were consistently external. Consequently, experts deemed this distinction redundant. Given that the taxonomy focuses on ports, internal factors were defined as those within the port's control, while external factors referred to elements beyond their influence.

For internal risk categories, the most relevant classifications identified were management, operations, infrastructure, and technology (see *Figure 2*). The management category encompasses organizational, financial, and human resource subcategories, addressing risks such as inadequate resource planning, ineffective decision-making, limited access to financial resources for operational costs, and challenges in maintaining optimal human resource conditions.

Although the literature typically divides operational categories into three subcategories—physical, information, and financial flows—the experts opted to align financial flows under management due to its growing strategic importance (Ilyas et al., 2023). The physical subcategory pertains to operational risks with tangible impacts, such as capacity shortages, congestion, or accidents. The information subcategory focuses on delays, inaccuracies, and security issues related to the exchange of information among supply chain actors.

Infrastructure risks, another internal category, reflect a port's responsibility to maintain accessibility from various modes of transport, including land, marine, rail, and highways. As a result, the subcategories identified were accessibility risks and facilities risks. Similarly, technological risks were classified as those arising from system failures, vulnerabilities in communication systems, and issues related to information and automation technologies.

Figure 2: Internal risk categories and sub-categories (own elaboration).




On the other hand, external risk categories were classified as environmental, societal, and network-related (see *Figure 3*). The environmental category was further divided into two subcategories: natural hazards, which depend on geography and include uncontrollable disasters that can harm infrastructure and people, and natural environment risks, such as adverse weather, pollution, or impacts on marine habitats.

Society, a complex category over which ports have minimal or no control, was broken into four subcategories. Economic or market risks include economic crises, seasonality, and changes in trade policies. Geopolitical risks, which have gained prominence recently, include political instability, wars, conflicts, and migration. Security risks have also become more significant, encompassing cyberattacks, terrorism, smuggling, and security failures. In addition, human factors were identified, such as strikes, public opposition, or epidemics.

Finally, a first-order category for network risks was established, based on the International Association of Ports and Harbors recommendations (IAPH, 2023). This category was deemed crucial due to ports' dependence on supply chain actors upstream and downstream. The subcategories defined for this group were supply risks, demand risks, and route disruption risks. Although these are external factors, their occurrence directly impacts port operations negatively.


Figure 3: External risk categories and sub-categories (own elaboration).



3.8 Risk factor definition (phase 8) – Case study: Port of Valencia, Spain

The focus group of experts in the port sector – as mentioned before, two industrial engineers with expertise in port organization management, two academics specialized in project management, and two professionals from port-related organizations – defined the third level of the taxonomy for the case study of the Port of Valencia, Spain. It consisted of identifying the through Scrum methodology (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Scrum methodology phases.



Scrum is applied to collaborative teamwork and is considered to have a great potential in complex environments where innovation and flexibility are essential. In this way, sprints were organized by a Scrum Master who was responsible for convening and leading 45 minutes work sessions that allowed for an optimized disaggregation of risk sub-categories in specific risk factors.

The risk factors included in the Port of Valencia case study were determined through an expert-driven approach using Scrum methodology. This process incorporated both recent literature findings and professional judgment from a focus group composed of maritime sector experts. This ensures that the risks identified are both empirically grounded and practically relevant to the port context.

4. Results

As a result, this study presents an innovative hierarchical taxonomy of port risks for the case of the Port of Valencia (Spain), structured across three distinct levels: Level 1 comprises the overarching risk categories, Level 2 encompasses the specific risk sub-categories, and Level 3 details the individual risk factors (*Table 2*).

Table 2: Port risk taxonomy (own elaboration).

Risk category	Risk sub-category	Risk factor	References
ENVIRONMENTAL	NATURAL HAZARDS	Hydrological Geophysical Gravitational Atmospheric	(Verschuur et al., 2022); (Balakrishnan et al., 2022); (Verschuur et al., 2023); (Wang T., Ding, et al., 2024); (Wang T., Ng, et al., 2024)
	NATURAL ENVIRONMENT	Adverse/ severe weather conditions Geotechnical conditions Marine habitat Maritime pollution Noise pollution Archeological risk Unexploded ordnance Chemical contaminants	(Azevêdo et al., 2021); (Dang et al., 2025); (Tzeng et al., 2021); (Wang P. et al., 2023); (Karaca et al., 2022); (IAPH, 2023); (Itoh & Zhang, 2023); (Fernandez-Perez et al., 2024)
SOCIETY	ECONOMIC / MARKET FACTORS	Market changes Trade policy instability Economic instability GDP growth or decline Change in customs rules Supplier risk High concentration in few cargo interests	(Nagi & Kersten, 2022); (Wu & Liu, 2025); (Kuang et al., 2021); (Verschuur et al., 2023); (IAPH, 2023); (Wang N. et al., 2024);

Risk category	Risk sub-category	Risk factor	References
SOCIETY	ECONOMIC / MARKET FACTORS	Major variabilities in demand	(Sajith et al., 2024);
		Competition from another port	(Rodrigues et al., 2024); (Akac &
		Adverse economic climate	Anagnostopoulou , 2025); (Jia &
		Seasonality	Zhang, 2021);
		Changes in customer preferences	(Zhou, 2022)
		Bankruptcy of a major port user	
		Change of interest rates	
		Fluctuation of fuel and electricity price	
		Unattractive markets	
		Taxes changes	
	GEOPOLITICAL	Government decision changes	(IAPH, 2023);
		Contract changes	(Rodriguez-Diaz et al., 2024);
		Irregular migration	(Wang N. et al., 2024); (Sajith
		War and conflict	et al., 2024);
		Policy risks	(Rodrigues et al., 2024)
		Bribery and corruption	
		Cultural obstacles	
		Political instability	
	SECURITY	Expropriation or nationalization of assets	
		Cyber attack	(Chlomoudis et al., 2024);
		Fire and explosion	(Grigoriadis et al., 2022); (Hu et al., 2023);
		Piracy	(Rodriguez-Diaz et al., 2024);
		Terrorism	(Perkovič et al., 2024); (Tahesh et al., 2023)
		Crime	
		Smuggling	
		Cargo theft	
	HUMAN	Trafficking	
		Security failures	
		Spying	
		Strikes or blockages	(Ilyas et al., 2023); (IAPH, 2023); (Gonçalves et al., 2025);
		Public opposition	(Wang N. et al., 2024)
		Epidemics	
		Industrial action	
		Human errors	

Risk category	Risk sub-category	Risk factor	References
NETWORK	SUPPLY	High dependency on key suppliers Disruption / events further up the supply chain	(IAPH, 2023); (Zhou, 2022); (Akac & Anagnostopoulou, 2025)
	DEMAND	Changing vessel size High dependency on key clients Disruption / events further down the supply chain	(IAPH, 2023); (Zhou, 2022); (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2022)
	ROUTE DISRUPTIONS	Changing routes Maritime accidents Bottlenecks/ restriction transportation routes	(United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2022)
MANAGEMENT	ORGANIZATIONAL	Ineffective governance Lack of oversight Insufficient resources Poor planning Intervention by authorities Conflicting priorities among port stakeholders Ineffective communication Poor quality management Complex and lengthy approval procedure Innovation risks Bureaucracy Conflicts with contractual and statutory obligations Lack of cooperation Poor safety culture	(Nagi & Kersten, 2022); (Akac & Anagnostopoulou, 2025); (Kuang et al., 2021)
	FINANCIAL	Absence of risk transfer (Insurance and diversification) Insufficient access to credit Uncertainty of revenue due to price volatility Access to finance Payment delay from partners Break of contracts Partners with bad credit Cash flow problem	(Sajith et al., 2024); (Ilyas et al., 2023); (Jia & Zhang, 2021); (Lamii et al., 2022)

Risk category	Risk sub-category	Risk factor	References
OPERATIONS	HUMAN RESOURCE	Worker health	(Akac & Anagnostopoulou, 2025); (S. Wang et al., 2024); (Ilyas et al., 2023); (Kuang et al., 2021); (Lamii et al., 2022)
		Lack of training	
		Accuracy of work	
		Performance rates	
		Lack of skilled workers	
		Lack of motivation	
		Mental health risks	
		Human errors	
		Inadequate compliance of standards	
	PHYSICAL	Container handling capacity	(Rodrigues et al., 2024); (Ilyas et al., 2023); (Jia & Zhang, 2021); (Ouedraogo et al., 2022); (Gui et al., 2022)
		Operational services risks	
		Navigation channels	
		Inaccurate demand forecast	
		Dangerous goods risks	
		Congestions	
		Lack of flexibility	
	INFORMATION	Accidents	(Ilyas et al., 2023); (Jia & Zhang, 2021); (Zhou, 2022)
		Cargo waste risks	
		Information delay	
		Information inaccuracy	
		Internet security	
		Poor information sharing	
INFRASTRUCTURE	ACCESSIBILITY	Lack of information	(IAPH, 2023); (Rodrigues et al., 2024)
		Standardization and compatibility	
		Marine access	
		Official inspections	
		Land access	
		Accessibility to railways	
		Accessibility to highways	
		Accessibility to other facilities	
		Accessibility to customers	
		Hinterland connectivity	
		Insufficient berthing capability	

Risk category	Risk sub-category	Risk factor	References
TECHNOLOGY	FACILITIES	Damage to facilities	(Wang S. et al., 2024); (Ouedraogo et al., 2022); (Jia & Zhang, 2021); (Kuang et al., 2021)
		Maintenance risks	
		Infrastructure maintenance costs	
		Construction delays	
		Multimodal infrastructure development	
		Port capacity and space	
		Electricity failures	
		Asset damage or loss	
	TECHNOLOGICAL	System / machine failure	(Nagi & Kersten, 2022); (Akac & Anagnostopoulou, 2025); (Lamii et al., 2022)
		Communications disruptions	
		Automation disruptions	
		Information systems disruptions	
		No technology mature	
		Old technological means and methods	
		Technological maintenance costs	
		Fire/explosion in machinery	
		Loss of key utilities	
		IT vulnerability	

5. Comparative analysis of risk taxonomies

A thorough comparison between the baseline taxonomy from Ouedraogo et al. (2020) (Table 1) and the updated, hierarchical taxonomy proposed by the authors of this study for the Port of Valencia (Table 2) reveals several significant advancements in both structure and content. These changes substantiate the validity and practical relevance of the new taxonomy.

5.1 Structural evolution: from flat to hierarchical

The original taxonomy from Ouedraogo et al. consists of a flat two-level structure—risk classes and associated risk items. While foundational for its time, this format lacks granularity and becomes unwieldy when applied to complex, real-world scenarios such as those faced by modern ports. The new taxonomy addresses this limitation by introducing a three-tier structure: categories (Level 1), subcategories (Level 2), and specific risk factors (Level 3). This layered architecture provides a clearer, more actionable framework for decision-makers, supporting better prioritization and risk treatment planning.

5.2 Content expansion and thematic refinement

Whereas Table 1 from Ouedraogo et al. offers a useful baseline through seven broad risk classes, the proposed taxonomy in Table 2 reorganizes and significantly expands the scope

and specificity of port-related risks. This shift reflects not only the complexity of the modern maritime environment but also new technological and social dynamics.

Technology Risk. This is a major innovation absent from the original taxonomy. Table 2 includes a dedicated technology category that addresses system failures, automation disruptions, and communication breakdowns. Crucially, it also acknowledges the exponential development of artificial intelligence (AI). While AI offers efficiency gains, it also introduces vulnerabilities such as algorithmic errors, data quality issues, and exposure to sophisticated cyberattacks – which are becoming increasingly prominent in the digitalization of port operations.

Societal Risks. The proposed taxonomy expands societal risks beyond general security issues to include human factors such as public opposition to port expansions or environmental degradation. These concerns reflect a broader generational shift in values, particularly among Generation Z, who are more environmentally conscious and globally aware. Their perception of ports is not just as logistical hubs but as entities with significant environmental and social footprints. Table 2 also introduces a more granular approach to workforce-related risks by recognizing strikes or industrial actions from various collectives—not just port workers, but also freight forwarders, carriers, and customs brokers, among others. The experience of the COVID-19 pandemic has also elevated the relevance of public health-related disruptions, leading to the inclusion of epidemics as a defined risk subcategory.

Organizational Risks. While in Table 1 these are limited to inefficiency and poor planning, the new taxonomy embeds them under a more structured management category. Within this, organizational risks now include failures in governance, oversight, and communication, along with emerging issues like innovation risks—such as failure to adopt new technologies or resistance to change in port governance structures. The taxonomy also separates out human resource-related risks, giving distinct attention to worker health, motivation, training, skill shortages, and even mental health concerns, all of which have gained significant importance in recent literature and port resilience planning.

Network Risks. Table 2 introduces a robust classification of risks stemming from a port's interconnectedness within global logistics networks. In particular, route disruption risks are a critical addition. Events such as the blockage of the Suez Canal in 2021 or rerouting of vessels around the Cape of Good Hope are illustrative of how a single chokepoint can create cascading delays and congestion. These examples underline the necessity of accounting for macro-logistical vulnerabilities in modern port risk assessments.

5.3 Addressing recent global events

The updated taxonomy directly responds to major global disruptions that have reshaped the maritime sector over the past five years—disruptions that were not yet present or fully identified when Ouedraogo et al. developed their framework. Key additions include:

Geopolitical Risks. Table 2 introduces a detailed subcategory capturing risks such as wars, policy shifts, irregular migration, and nationalization of assets. These reflect the heightened volatility in global affairs following the Russia-Ukraine war, Middle Eastern instability (e.g., ship attacks from Yemen), and the imposition of unilateral trade measures such as the Trump-era tariffs.

Public Health and Human Risk. In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, risks such as epidemics, industrial action, and workforce availability have been given their own subcategories, acknowledging their disruptive potential on port operations.

Natural Environment Risks. Unlike the original taxonomy which grouped all environmental hazards into a single broad category, Table 2 distinguishes between natural hazards (e.g., earthquakes, floods) and natural environment risks. The latter subcategory was deliberately created to capture the environmental effects caused by the port's own activities, including marine habitat degradation, maritime pollution, chemical contamination, and noise pollution. These risks reflect increasing environmental scrutiny of port operations and recognize their role as both victims and contributors to environmental stress. Notably, this subcategory also acknowledges the shifting priorities of younger generations—particularly Generation Z—who exhibit heightened environmental consciousness and expect sustainability to be a core consideration in infrastructure planning and governance. Addressing such environmental concerns is essential not only for regulatory compliance but also for maintaining public legitimacy and stakeholder trust.

5.4 Risk factor granularity

Another major advancement in Table 2 is its significantly enhanced level of granularity. Rather than presenting generalized or overlapping risks, the new taxonomy disaggregates complex risks into their component elements. This allows for more precise diagnosis, prioritization, and mitigation strategies within port management and resilience planning.

For instance, in Table 1, the supply risk “lack of equipment” is listed as a standalone item. The new taxonomy dissects this into container handling capacity, congestion, damage to facilities, and technological obsolescence, offering more actionable insight for operational planning.

Similarly, where “fire” and “piracy” are broadly categorized under operational risk in Table 1, Table 2 moves these to a security subcategory under societal risks. This reflects contemporary understandings of threat sources—positioning these as part of intentional, hostile, or criminal actions rather than internal operational failures.

In addition, there is an increase in granularity of information-related risks, Table 1 omits these entirely, whereas the new taxonomy highlights issues such as information delays, inaccuracy, lack of compatibility between systems, and standardization failures, all of which can severely impact real-time port operations and coordination with external actors.

By grounding Table 2 in localized expertise and operational data, the taxonomy moves beyond theoretical generalizations and becomes a practically usable tool for port authorities, terminal operators, and resilience planners. This level of contextualization significantly enhances its value for applied risk management.

6. Conclusions

In conclusion, the proposed taxonomy by the authors of the present contribution a major advancement in the categorization of risks, offering a more structured and detailed approach compared to the base taxonomy. By incorporating categories, subcategories, and individual risk factors, it enhances clarity and precision. Its inclusion of specific elements—such as “Accessibility,” “Facilities,” and “Technological Maintenance”—and context-specific risks like maritime pollution and hinterland connectivity underscores its relevance to evolving industry demands.

Notably, the taxonomy's interdisciplinary scope covers environmental, financial, societal, and technological risks, enabling a comprehensive approach to risk management. Its emphasis on governance, oversight, and communication as part of organizational risks highlights the critical role of efficient management in mitigating disruptions. By addressing both traditional and

emerging risks, including automation failures and outdated technologies, the taxonomy demonstrates adaptability and forward-thinking in its design.

This updated framework, grounded in research spanning 2021 to 2025, reflects contemporary trends and offers a more nuanced perspective compared to pre-2020 classifications. The introduction of subcategories within broader risk categories, such as "Natural Hazards" and "Geopolitical," enhances its practical applicability, particularly for industries like maritime and port operations that require detailed risk assessments. Overall, the refined taxonomy provides a robust, systematic tool for risk identification and decision-making, meeting current challenges while remaining flexible for future developments.

Further research should focus on the establishment of a robust methodology to identify and define individual risks stemming from the risk factors outlined in the taxonomy. This methodology should ensure that risks are specific enough to allow for detailed analyses of their impact and probability. Additionally, the prioritization of categories and risk factors should be refined using accurate and systematic criteria to improve decision-making processes and enhance the taxonomy's effectiveness in managing risks across diverse domains

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Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence

No generative artificial intelligence was used in preparing this communication.

Communication aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals

